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Abstract: Financial markets are a clear example of a choice-dealing situation in which people
have to make decisions facing uncertainty and risk. This study aims to learn how people make
decisions, in order to predict them, by analysing the data collected in a social experiment and
using tools of information theory and statistics. It focuses on how people’s own experience influence
their next actions and what strategies are developed finding that both the market and the previous
results influence decisions with a mutual information value of 0.045±0.010 bits and 0.050±0.010 bits
respectively and that these two stochastic processes add non-redundant information to each other.
Besides, in the experiment, people’s memory holds for only one round. Finally, the ’toy’ model
tested gives a 55.200±0.016% success ratio for the market’s influence and a 53.496±0.016% for the
results influence analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Taking decisions is a very relevant issue in human’s
daily life: almost constantly people choose between dif-
ferent options, generally looking for the most beneficial
result. But when humans have to take decisions there are
many factors that can, conscious or unconsciously, affect
their choice. For instance, their ability to understand the
information, their previous experience or framing aspects
among many other factors. This may lead them to de-
velop basic strategies to address the problems they face.
In the context of financial markets, economic theories
have always tried to understand how traders make deci-
sions thus bridging the gap between orders being placed
in the market and the price dynamics. In the framework
of classic economy, utility theory considers that humans
are rational when making decisions and always bet for
what they think will be most beneficial for them. Nev-
ertheless, in the last decades alternative theories that in-
troduce the traders psychology and also their ability to
understand facts and information [3] have been proposed.
The experiment analysed took place the 14th and
15th of December 2013 at the Board Games Festival
DAU Barcelona at Fabra i Coats-Fa`brica de Creacio´
de Barcelona and was carried out by the Research
Group Open Systems of the Department of Fundamental
Physics of the University of Barcelona. It consisted of a
game in which participants had to predict the market’s
daily action (rise or fall) for 25 consecutive rounds with
maximum 30 seconds to answer per round. The mar-
ket followed a daily-time evolution extracted from actual
stock market series and depending on whether the par-
ticipants’ decision was right or not, they won or lost.
Besides, participants had the opportunity at each round
to consult some information available: the market’s evo-
lution averaged over the last 5 days and 30 days, the
market’s value evolution minute to minute of the last
day, an expert’s opinion (who was right 60% of times),
the market’s daily move (up or down) of the last 30 days
and the tendency of some stock market’s of the world, a
rather typical basic information that market traders take
into consideration. There were also four different modal-
ities of game restricting different aspects such as the time
available to answer or the information available. In the
experiment participated 283 people (184 males and 99
females) of all ages from below 12 to 65 years old. The
global success ratio was 53.43% and it has to be taken
into account that, due to the actual market series used
in the game, the market had a general tendency to rise
of 55.69% (it is possible to play the game through the
website, mr-banks.net).
For what it concerns to the data analysis point of view,
each round can be characterized by the market’s action,
the player’s decision and its result (right or wrong de-
pending on whether the decision is equal to the market’s
movement or not). Thus, the data collected can be in-
terpreted as three discrete temporal sequences or three
stochastic binary processes: the market’s evolution, the
decision’s path and the result series.
This study is developped in the framework of infor-
mation theory in order to understand how the decision’s
path is affected by the other two sequences and so what
amount of information is encoded in these processes and
if it allows us to predict future decisions. In this sense, it
should be noted that the underlying motivation in pre-
dicting decisions is not to know what the market’s evolu-
tion is going to be but what the reactions to its movement
or to the investing succes can be. Thus, in the following
sections we study in detail the mutual information de-
pendence between these pairs of processes alone and also
their interdependence. Then we proceed to stablish the
memory of a particular decision, i.e., how information is
lost going backwards in time. Finally, with the results
found a ’toy’ model is tested with the aim to see if with
this information it is actually possible to predict deci-
sions.
How humans take decisions: financial markets as a case of study Carlota Segura Garc´ıa
II. QUANTIFYING THE INFLUENCES ON THE
DECISION’S PATH: MUTUAL
INFORMATION
Probability can be interpreted as the uncertainty about
the occurrence or not of a certain event [1], that is to say,
if the probability of a certain event is 1 (or 0) there is
no such uncertainty: the event will always (never) take
place. In this sense, a measure of the amount of uncer-
tainty of a random variable X can be defined in terms of





where the sum is extended over all the possible values xi
of the random variableX. As a convention, the logarithm
is expressed with base 2 so all values are measured in bits.
Let us introduce too the conditional entropy H(Y |X),
the uncertainty on X provided Y occurs,




IfX and Y are two stochastic processes, a way to measure
its mutual dependence is to compute its mutual informa-
tion (MI). Taking these two entropies into account, the
mutual information MI is defined as [1]










where p(x, y) is the joint probability and p(x) and p(y),
the marginal probabilities of the two random variables X
and Y . MI is defined positive and, when equal to 0, vari-
ables are completely independent and, when equal to 1,
they are perfectly correlated (for a deeper discussion see
Appendix A). Actually, MI is a measure of the amount
of information one random variable contains about an-
other [2], so it will thus allow to find out how much the
market’s action and the player’s result at a certain step
tells us about the next decision.
First of all let us compute the MI involving the mar-
ket’s (M ) previous action, at round ’n-1 ’, and the ’nth’
decision (D). Taking ino account the huge amount of in-
formation available in the game, imitating what the mar-
ket has done would be the most logical and also simplest
strategy to follow. As can be seen in Fig. 1, we are com-
puting the MI of these two processes with the mentioned
displacement since we are interested in the influence of
the market’s previous action on the decision.
The MI obtained for these two processes is (for a more
detailed discussion of the errors see the Appendix B)
I(Mn−1, Dn) = 0.045± 0.010 bits.
Apart from imitating the market’s movements, another
usual way to proceed is by trial-error as people usually
Strategy based on the market’s movement
FIG. 1: A possible market’s sequence and a possible decision’s
path. Green arrows pointing ’up’ mean that the market rises
or that the player has made this prediction. Red arrows point-
ing ’down’ mean that it falls or it that the player has made
this prediction. The inclined red arrow shows the displace-
ment relation studied.
Strategy based on the previous result
FIG. 2: A possible result sequence and a possible strategy
followed: ’change’ or ’repeat ’ the previous decision. The in-
clined red arrow shows the displacement relation studied. It
has to be noted that the first decision has been discarded as
it has no market previous action to be compared with.
learn to choose by adapting its decisions to their success.
For this reason we study the influence of the previous
result on the next decision. Taking into account that
when analysing what the previous result (R) has been
(’right ’ or ’wrong ’) we are not distinguishing what the
previous decision was (’up’ or ’down’), the decision’s path
of the player is now expressed in terms of ’repeating ’ or
’changing ’ the decision (D) (for more clarity see Fig. 2).
The MI value obtained in this case is
I(Rn−1, Dn) = 0.050± 0.010 bits.
It can be seen that in both cases the value of MI is not
equal to zero, which means that, as expected, the deci-
sion process is not independent of the market and the
success process. To validate the importance of these re-
sults, we have computed the MI of the market with itself,
I(Mn−1,Mn) = 0.003±0.010 bits, and also the MI of the
player’s own action, I(Dn−1, Dn) = 0.005± 0.010 bits to
see what information encode these processes alone and to
better interpret the results obtained up to now. In these
two last cases MI can be considered zero since its error
covers this value. Taking a look to all the values found it
can be said that neither the market nor the decision alone
encode information about their own next action while the
market and the result, separately, do have influence on
the decision.
A. Interdependence between both pairs of
sequences
We have studied the dependence of the decision’s path
on the market’s action and the result sequence separately
as if the market and the result affected independently the
player. Nevertheless, it could be possible that these two
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processes were affected by each other and that when con-
sidering both influences more information was encoded.
In order to see if taking both processes into account









Thus, we study the influence of the result on the market-
decision comparison I(Mn−1, D − n|Rn−1) and also the
influence of the market’s action on the result-decision
comparison I(Rn−1, Dn|Mn−1). As before, in these two
values both the market and the result belong to round
’n-1 ’ while the decision belongs to the nth round. The
CMIs obtained are
I(Mn−1, Dn|Rn−1) = 0.05± 0.04 bits,
and
I(Rn−1, Dn|Mn−1) = 0.07± 0.04 bits.
Both values are positive which means that the market
and the result sequence add non-redundant information.
However, we shall also point that the market’s behaviour
adds more information.
B. Conditional Probabilities
To better understand the I(Mn−1, Dn) and
I(Rn−1, Dn) values, the conditional probabilities
for the decision being ’up’ or ’down’ knowing the
market’s previous action or the player’s previous result
and the marginal probabilities for the two versions of
the decisions’ path have been computed. It can be seen
that these probabilities are statistically relevant in all
cases compared to the marginal probabilities, as shown
in Tab. I. This can make us think that these MI values
obtained are too low, but the fact is that MI is a sum
of terms weighted by its respective joint probabilities
and so it can be interpreted as an average in which no
special cases stand out.
Let us highlight an interesting result related to these
probabilities. In the game proposed in the experiment,
player’s won or lost exactly the same amount (a 5% of
their virtual ’money’, starting from 1000) in the case they
suceeded or failed respectively. Thereby, no matter what
the market’s actions were, if the predicition was right,
the player won. In this sense, under the point of view of
the utility theory, which considers decision-makers as ra-
tional [3], no difference between conditional probabilities
given a particular action (rise, for instance) should be
expected. However it is remarkable that p(Dun|Mun−1) is
much higher than p(Ddn|Mdn−1). Thus, it can be said that
there is a general tendency to follow the market when it is
rising that has made player’s think the market will keep
on this upward trend for at least one more round.
Conditional probabilities Marginal probabilities
Decision and market’s events
p(Dun|Mun−1) = 0.714± 0.005
p(Ddn|Mun−1) = 0.286± 0.005 p(Dun) = 0.607± 0.004
p(Dun|Mdn−1) = 0.469± 0.006 p(Ddn) = 0.393± 0.004
p(Ddn|Mdn−1) = 0.531± 0.006
Decision and result’s events
p(Drpn |Rrn−1) = 0.682± 0.005
p(Dchn |Rrn−1) = 0.318± 0.005 p(Drpn ) = 0.561± 0.004
p(Drpn |Rwn−1) = 0.421± 0.006 p(Dchn ) = 0.439± 0.004
p(Dchn |Rwn−1) = 0.579± 0.006
TABLE I: Comparison between conditional probabilities and
marginal probabilities. We show the conditional probabilities
of the decision (D) being up, ’u’, or down, ’d ’, in the nth
round having the market (M ) raised (’u’) or fallen (’d ’) in the
’n-1 ’ round, the conditional probabilities of repeating (’rp’)
or changing (’ch’) the decision (D) having the previous result
(R) been right, ’r ’, or wrong, ’w ’, and the respective marginal
probabilities for the decision being specifically up or down and
for changing or repeating the previous decision.
III. LOSS OF INFORMATION
Up to now we have observed that the knowledge of the
events of the previous round reduces uncertainty about
the player’s next decision, specially when considering
particular cases. Such encodement of the information
suggests that players have memory of the last round and
that this influences their strategy. But now it can be
asked whether this memory is wider or not, i.e., if, for
instance, events that have taken place at round ’n-2 ’ can
tell something about the nth decision.
In order to study how previous rounds are actually
relevant on the decision, the MI of the market’s action
and the player’s result at round ’n-2 ’ being the player’s
decision at the nth round have been computed obtaining
I(Mn−2, Dn) = 0.001± 0.009 bits
and
I(Rn−2, Dn) = 0.002± 0.010 bits.
We can observe that these values are not differentiable
from 0 and, thus, in general no information about the
next decision is encoded two rounds before.
Therefore, it can be said that only the previous
round influences the player’s decision, so its memory
holds for only one round. Nevertheless, as said be-
fore, the MI is a thermalized value and in some spe-
cial cases memory could be wider. For that reason, as
done in Sect. II, the conditional probabilities consid-
ering the two previous rounds, p(Dn|Mn−1,Mn−2) and
p(Dn|Rn−1, Dn−1, Rn−2), have been computed and are
shown in Tab. II. It has to be noted that in the case
of the result-decision comparison, the decision of the ’n-
2 ’ round has been taken as a condition too since in this
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Decision conditioned to
Two previous market’s action Two previous results and previous decision
p(Dun|Mun−1,Mun−2) = 0.709 ± 0.006 p(Drpn |Rrn−1,Drpn−1,Rrn−2) = 0.715 ± 0.008 p(Drpn |Rrn−1, Drpn−1, Rwn−2) = 0.670 ± 0.012
p(Ddn|Mun−1,Mun−2) = 0.291 ± 0.006 p(Dchn |Rrn−1,Drpn−1,Rrn−2) = 0.285 ± 0.008 p(Dchn |Rrn−1, Drpn−1, Rwn−2) = 0.330 ±0.012
p(Dun|Mdn−1,Mun−2) =0.493 ± 0.008 p(Drpn |Rwn−1, Drpn−1, Rrn−2) = 0.412 ± 0.010 p(Drpn |Rwn−1,Drpn−1,Rwn−2) = 0.550 ± 0.013
p(Ddn|Mdn−1,Mun−2) = 0.507 ± 0.008 p(Dchn |Rwn−1, Drpn−1, Rrn−2) = 0.588 ± 0.010 p(Dchn |Rwn−1,Drpn−1,Rwn−2) = 0.450± 0.013
p(Dun|Mun−1,Mdn−2) = 0.716 ± 0.007 p(Drpn |Rrn−1,Dchn−1,Rrn−2) = 0.526 ± 0.014 p(Drpn |Rrn−1,Dchn−1,Rwn−2) = 0.715 ± 0.010
p(Ddn|Mun−1,Mdn−2)= 0.284 ± 0.007 p(Dchn |Rrn−1,Dchn−1,Rrn−2) = 0.474 ± 0.014 p(Dchn |Rrn−1,Dchn−1,Rwn−2) = 0.285 ± 0.010
p(Dun|Mdn−1,Mdn−2) = 0.447± 0.008 p(Drpn |Rwn−1, Dchn−1, Rrn−2) = 0.408 ± 0.014 p(Drpn |Rwn−1,Dchn−1,Rwn−2) = 0.350 ±0.011
p(Ddn|Mdn−1,Mdn−2) = 0.553 ± 0.008 p(Dchn |Rwn−1, Dchn−1, Rrn−2) = 0.592 ± 0.014 p(Dchn |Rwn−1,Dchn−1,Rwn−2) = 0.650 ± 0.011
TABLE II: Conditional probabilites of the decision considering the last two rounds. Shows the conditional probabilities of
the decision (D) depending on the market’s (M ) or the result’s (R) two previous events. The superindices ’rp’ mean ’repeat ’
decision, ’ch’ means ’change’ decision, ’r ’ means that the prediction was ’right ’ and ’w ’ that it was ’wrong ’. The values in bold
are those statistically relevant compared to values shown in Tab. I.
case we are interested in knowing how the player adapts
at each step its strategy and thus if, for example, it tends
to repeat its decision when it has been successful.
We can observe that, when comparing the probabilities
that represent the same event in the nth and ’n-1 ’ rounds,
in some cases (values in bold) these conditional probabili-
ties are statistically relevant from the ones shown in Tab.
I while in some other cases they are not. That is to say
that, for example, we have compared p(Dun|Mdn−1,Mun−2)
with p(Dun|Mdn−1) and p(Drpn |Rrn−1, Dchn−1, Rwn−2) with
p(Drpn |Rrn−1).
It is remarkable that the probability of repeating the
decision when the result has been correct, increases when
this situation takes place two consecutive times compared
to when it only happens once. In a similar way, the
probability of changing the decision when the player has
failed to predict also increases when these events take
place twice. Therefore, it seems like there is a tendency
of the players to adapt their decisions depending on their
success.
On the other hand, the probability of following the
market’s rising trend of the two previous rounds is not
differentiable from that of considering only the previous
round. Contrarily, the probability of following the mar-
ket’s tendency when it has fallen twice increases with
respect to considering only the previous movement. This
facts can be understood as there is some distrust to be-
lieve that the upward trend will keep for more rounds,
although this probability is still high, while if the ten-
dency is downwards the reliance on this trend increases.
IV. TESTING A ’TOY’ MODEL
Troughout the study, we have observed that informa-
tion about the player’s decisions is indeed encoded in the
market’s different actions and in the player’s own results.
Besides, in the last section we have seen that in terms of
MI, only what has happened in the previous round influ-
ences the next decision.
In order to see if taking all these facts into account we
are capable of predicting what the decisions are, and so
how people take decisions, we propose a ’toy’ model using
the conditional probabilities shown in Tab. I. However,
as the data available is limited, in order to test the model
in a more rigorous way, the conditional probabilities have
been computed using only half of the population’s data
(selected randomnly). Then, these conditional probabil-
ities have been used to predict what the decisions of the
other half of the population are in the two different anal-
ysis developed throghout this study, the market-decision
and the result-decision comparisons, according to the ac-
tual moves of the market and results of the players in
each game. This process has been repeated 1000 times
in each analysis in order to obtain the average ratio of
success and its standard deviation.
In the case of the analysis of the market’s influence the
success ratio obtained has been 55.200 ± 0.016%. Simi-
larly, for the result’s influence the success ratio obtained
has been 53.496 ± 0.016%. Both are a little bit higher
than 50% (throwing a coin). It has to be highlighted,
though, that we have considered that all player’s make
decisions in the same way, i.e., we are not distinguishing
between those who follow strategies from those who play
more randomnly.
This ’toy’ model can still be improved since we could
add the fact that both the market and the previous result
influence at the same time the player’s decision. Besides,
although it has been seen that the memory stands only
for one round in terms of the MI, some of the conditional
probabilities going to two rounds before are still relevant
and, thus, the model could be more detailed and imple-
ment these probabilities too.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Information theory has applications in many different
fields such as neurobiology, thermal physics or quantum
computing [2]. In this study it has proved to be a useful
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alternative to merely statistics as it has allowed us to ex-
tract more information about what influences decisions
and also to complement the conditional probabilities ob-
tained.
We have observed that both the market’s action and
the results obtained influence the player’s decisions since
both processes encode information about the latter as
their MI values, I(Mn−1, Dn) and I(Rn−1, Dn), are dif-
ferent from zero. Besides, these two processes, the mar-
ket’s and the reult’s one, add non-redundant information
to each other, which means that, as could be expected,
player’s decisions are influenced at the same time by the
market’s movements and by their success.
In general, the player’s memory stands only for one
round in both analysis since the value of MI drops
abruptly when considering the two previous rounds com-
pared to the value obtained considering only to the pre-
vious round and it cannot be distinguished from zero.
Nevertheless, some of the conditional probabilities com-
puted for the two previous rounds shown in Tab. II are
still statistically relevant compared to those computed
with only one condition shown in Tab. I.
When looking in detail these sets of conditional prob-
abilities for the market-decision comparison looking for
the basic strategy of imitating the market, it is remark-
able the great difference between the tendency to follow
the market when it has risen than when it has fallen.
This fact shows that player’s have a relative preference
for the market to rise and thus they are not strictly think-
ing in terms of only benefit and this contradicts the as-
sumptions of rationality of utility theory. On the other
hand, when considering two rounds, we observe that the
probabilities of following the market’s clear upward and
downward tendencies do not vary or increase consider-
ably compared to going to one step but rather they are
mantained. This reflects a certain resistance of player’s
to trust in long trends.
On the other hand, when looking the sets of condi-
tional probabilities for the result-decision comparison it
we observe that there is a clear strategy that consists in
betting by trial-error, i.e., repeating the decision when
being successful and changing it when it has failed, that
is increased when considering the two previous rounds.
Testing the fact that memory holds for one round and
implementing the conditional probabilities shown in Tab.
I, we are able to predict player’s decisions in more than
50% of the cases. Nevertheless, this ’toy’ model could
be improved using the statistically relevant conditional
probabilities when gonig to two rounds before and also
trying to distinguish different ways of deciding.
VI. APPENDIX
A. Mutual Information
In order to verify that the MI algorithm has been cor-
rectly implemented, two programs have been designed.
The first one generates randomnly a market sequence
and a decision path so that when computing MI the ex-
pected value is 0 as they are independent. The second
program generates a market sequence randomnly and a
decision path following exactly what the market has done
in the previous round. In this case the expected value
is 1 as they are perfectly related. Since in both cases
these values have been obtained with a discrepancy of
just the 0, 01%, it can be considered that MI algorithm
used throughout the study is coorect.
B. Errors
As mentioned in the Introduction, all three stochastic
processes (market, result and decision’s sequences) are
binary as only two outcomes are possible: ’up’/’down’
or ’right ’/’wrong ’. Therefore, the error for the empirical






where z is the percentile for a standard normal distribu-
tion (in this case z = 1 has been used, which implies a
68% confidence level), p is the empirical probability and
N is the sample size (which can be different for differ-
ent joint and conditional probabilities). Proceeding from
this, all errors throughout the study have been computed
by error propagation.
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